Chris Cho

Can manipulated agents be morally responsible for what they do? Many find the claim that they can philosophically scandalous. In this dissertation, I argue otherwise. As a structuralist, I hold that an agent's moral responsibility is determined solely by their psychological or agential structure at the time of action. And as a hard-liner, I hold that manipulated agents are morally responsible because they satisfy certain structural conditions compatibilists find sufficient for moral responsibility. I therefore defend what I call hard-line structuralism.

Many find it plausible that acting freely requires a kind of sensitivity to reasons. Modalists define this sensitivity in terms of what S does in the relevant alternative possibilities. Agent modalists take S to be an agent, assessing their reasons-sensitivity by considering what the agent would have done in those possibilities. While intuitive, agent modalists struggle with Frankfurt cases. This has led some to a mechanism-based approach. Here, I raise two objections to this approach and defend agent modalism. I argue that (1) the mechanism approach permits composite mechanisms, leading to an unattractive disjunction, and (2) excluding the agent undermines the original appeal of reasons-sensitivity. I defend agent modalism by arguing it can handle Frankfurt cases if it holds fixed the nonoccurrence of agent-altering events. This requirement also helps address rational blind spots. Thus, I aim to rehabilitate agent modalism as a viable account of reasons-sensitivity in free action.